

Disclosure of Information ¹

Revised June 25, 2010

Pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 358.7(a) (November 2008)

| Date Posted | Message |
|-------------|---|
| 6/25/2010 | On Wednesday, June 23, 2010, two E.ON U.S. Marketing Function Employees inadvertently viewed non-public transmission customer information. |
| 5/19/2010 | On Wednesday, May 19, 2010, an E.ON U.S. Transmission Function Employee inadvertently shared non-public transmission customer information with an E.ON U.S. Marketing Function Employee. |
| 01/15/2010 | On December 22, 2009, in connection with enhancements being made to the E.ON U.S. Energy Management System (“EMS”), a display was put in service that allowed all EMS users, including E.ON U.S. marketing function employees, to view limited non-public transmission customer information regarding historic load amounts. This was noticed and corrected on January 13, 2010. |
| 11/12/2009 | On Thursday, November 12, 2009, an E.ON U.S. Services employee subject to the No Conduit Rule e-mailed transmission customer information to some Marketing Function Employees. |
| 11/2/2009 | On Monday, November 2, 2009, an E.ON U.S. Services employee subject to the No Conduit Rule e-mailed non-public transmission function information to a Marketing Function Employee. The same information was provided in a meeting on November 4, 2009. The non-public transmission function information was – <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Jan. 16: West Frankfort 138/69 kV transformer failed Sunday November 23. The transformer will be replaced with the spare 138/69 Transformer at the EOC. Work in progress to make that move. 2. June 19: Ghent 944 breaker failed catastrophically during checkout. Replacement is in progress. |
| 10/19/2009 | <p>Transmission Customer Question:</p> <p>Louisville Gas and Electric Company and Kentucky Utility Company received the following inquiry regarding operations on the Louisville Gas and Electric Company and Kentucky Utility Company combined transmission system:</p> <p>Please explain the following Madisonville system disturbances for the listed dates:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • May 8, 2009 at 12:50-13:48 Lightning storm on MMU system • May 29, 2009 at 9:05 • June 22, 2009, at 19:45 System Disturbance • July 3, 2009, at 16:52 System Disturbance • Sept. 3, 2009 at 20:47 Line relay in area • Sept. 7, 2009 at 1:32 Line relay in area <p><i>Answer:</i> The following transmission events were recorded surrounding the Madisonville, Kentucky area:</p> |

Note(s): 1.- Posting may also be made on LGEE OASIS administered by the SPP-ITO at:
<http://www.oatioasis.com/LGEE/index.html>.

Disclosure of Information ¹

Revised June 25, 2010

Pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 358.7(a) (November 2008)

| | |
|------------|---|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • May 8, 2009 Fault on distribution • May 29,, 2009 Unknown - believed fault on distribution • June 22, 2009 Storms/Lightning • July 3, 2009 Lightning - insulator failure • August 18, 2009 Cause unknown • September 3, 2009 Cause unknown <p>Each of these events was studied and it was verified that the Transmission Protection System operated correctly. As a result of these incidents, the 69 kV lines feeding Madisonville were ground patrolled August 24-28, 2009, with no issues found. These same lines were aerially patrolled on September 22, 2009, with no issues found.</p> |
| 09/15/2009 | On Wednesday, September 9, 2009, a LG&E/KU Transmission Function Employee, during a phone conversation with a LG&E/KU Regulated Generation Dispatcher, mentioned that the reason for a redispach was load relief on a 138 kV line from Cane Run to Paddy’s Run. A transcript of that call is attached hereto. <i>Conference Call of 09-09-2009</i> |
| 09-14-2009 | On Monday, September 14, 2009, a LG&E/KU Transmission Function Employee, during a three-way phone conference which included a LG&E/KU Regulated Generation Dispatcher and a TVA Reliability Employee, mentioned that the reason for TVA’s generation redispach directive was to relieve loading on the 138kV Pleasure Ridge to Ashby transmission line. A transcript of that call is attached hereto. <i>Three-Way Conference Call of 09-14-2009</i> |
| 01-10-2009 | On Saturday, January 10, 2009, a LG&E/KU Transmission Function employee inadvertently e-mailed non-public transmission information to two Marketing Function employees – one in the LG&E/KU Utility Marketing Group and the other in the LEM/WKE Non-utility Marketing Group. A copy of the relevant e-mail is attached hereto. <i>Transmission SOC E-mail of 01-10-2009</i> |
| 10-21-2008 | On Tuesday, October 21, 2008, a LG&E/KU Transmission function crew completed installation of a new 345/138 kV transformer at North American Stainless (NAS) in Carroll County, Kentucky. LG&E/KU serves NAS from a 345 kV radial feed and a 138 kV network feed. The transformer installation was to accommodate the projected summer peak load increase at the NAS 138 kV station that studies showed would result in 138 kV overloads and low voltages during contingencies. This construction would alleviate the identified problems and release capacity for additional load growth in the Carroll County area. When the work was completed, LG&E/KU Regulated Generation Dispatchers (RGDs) were able to see transmission network information, more specifically, the flow from the Ghent 345 kV station through the new NAS 345/138 kV transformer, for approximately 19 hours. When the LG&E/KU Transmission Energy Management System (EMS) group became aware of this, it immediately corrected the relevant EMS screen display. |

Note(s): 1.- Posting may also be made on LGEE OASIS administered by the SPP-ITO at: <http://www.oatioasis.com/LGEE/index.html>.

Disclosure of Information ¹

Revised June 25, 2010

Pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 358.7(a) (November 2008)

| | |
|------------|---|
| | <p>The Manager, LG&E/KU Regulated Generation Dispatch Operations (<i>Manager, RGD</i>) and the Group Leader, Electric System Coordination: Transmission System Control Centers separate reported this event to a Chief Compliance Officer Designee (<i>CCOD</i>). The Manager, RGD noted that Dispatchers were unaware of the type of information appearing on the EMS Screens, and RGD employees further noted they did nothing with the information, nor did they convey that information to others. By copy of e-mail to the CCOD, the Manager, Transmission EMS and Group Leader, Transmission EMS noted this event for the Manager, Transmission Protection and Substation. They further requested that Transmission Protection and Substation employees alert Transmission EMS when their future work might impact the Transmission EMS. A copy of the EMS Screen one which the information was inadvertently displayed is attached. The information appeared in upper right-hand panel labeled N/C Load. <i>EMS Reserves Summary Screen</i></p> |
| 08-04-2008 | <p>During an August 4 morning conference call to discuss LG&E/KU's readiness to respond to potential operational issues during an extended heat wave, a LG&E/KU Transmission function employee revealed that the Aiken-Oxmoor 69 kV transmission line was out due to a bus disconnect. This call included representatives of LG&E/KU Energy Marketing function (<i>Energy Marketing personnel</i>). The Energy Marketing personnel immediately announced they were leaving the call since it appeared that transmission details were being discussed. The LG&E/KU Transmission function employee reported this to the Compliance Department. A CCO designee (<i>CCOD</i>), joining the aforementioned call late, overheard the Energy Marketing personnel's announcement and their departure from the call. The Compliance Department directed the Energy Marketing personnel not to use this information in any way. The Compliance Department has also advised those coordinating any such future calls to conduct a roll call of departments so that various parties will know the degree to which they might share information.</p> |
| 07-28-2008 | <p>Late on July 28, 2008, an Operations Analyst in the LG&E/KU Transmission Energy Management System Department (<i>LG&E/KU Transmission EMS</i>) inadvertently spooled an EMS Transmission substation diagram to an EMS Local Area Network (<i>EMS LAN</i>) printer at the LG&E/KU Regulated Generation Dispatch Desk (<i>LG&E/KU Generation Dispatch</i>). On July 29, LG&E/KU Generation Dispatch reported this event to the Compliance Department along with the printout from its EMS LAN printer. The Compliance Department directed LG&E/KU Generation Dispatch not to use any information from the printout; LG&E/KU Generation Dispatch confirmed it did not copy the printout or use the information in any way. The Compliance Department reported this event to LG&E/KU Transmission EMS and determined that the action was inadvertent. During a recent relocation of computer hardware to a new Transmission Control Center it was possible that a former printer queue was left</p> |

Note(s): 1.- Posting may also be made on LG&E OASIS administered by the SPP-ITO at:
<http://www.oatioasis.com/LGEE/index.html>.

Disclosure of Information ¹

Revised June 25, 2010

Pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 358.7(a) (November 2008)

| | |
|------------|--|
| | <p>in place. The Compliance Department directed LG&E/KU Transmission EMS to remove the LG&E/KU Generation Dispatch EMS LAN printer from all print defaults at the new Transmission Control Center; LG&E/KU Transmission EMS has confirmed this removal. The relevant EMS LAN printout is contained in the attached file: <i>EMS LAN Printout</i></p> |
| 08-13-2007 | <p>On August 13, 2007, the Dynegy Dispatch Desk contacted the LG&E/KU Dix Dam Transmission Operations Center's Dispatch Desk (<i>LG&E/KU Transmission Dispatch</i>) to advise the latter that Dynegy would be taking its Bluegrass facility off-line. The LG&E/KU Transmission Dispatch forwarded this information to the LG&E/KU Regulated Generation Dispatch Desk (<i>LG&E/KU Generation Dispatch</i>). The Manager, LG&E/KU Generation Dispatch immediately reported this to a Chief Compliance Officer Designee (<i>CCOD</i>). The CCOD reviewed recorded calls and discussed this event with the Manager, LG&E/KU Generation Dispatch and the Group Leader, LG&E/KU Transmission Dispatch. Both were advised that, under the Standards of Conduct, this Dynegy customer information should not have been shared with LG&E/KU Generation Dispatch. The Group Leader has so advised all LG&E/KU Transmission Dispatch System Operators by e-mail, copy to the CCOD, that "<i>under no circumstances are we (System Operators) to transfer any calls from any IPP or Marketer to our generation group</i>". The CCOD has reiterated this with the System Operators including directing their attention to relevant regulations in 18 C.F.R. §§ 358.3 and 358.5.</p> |
| 08-07-2007 | <p>On August 1, 2007, a LG&E/KU Transmission Strategy/Planning employee received an e-mail from a LG&E/KU Major Accounts Representative requesting information about the costs associated with completing retail customer contract. The Transmission Strategy/Planning employee responded with customer-specific information but inadvertently included non customer-specific, transmission system when mentioning an "upgrade to the Fawkes to Lake Reba Tap 138 kV line". A Chief Compliance Office designee (CCO designee) advised both the Major Accounts Representative and the Transmission Strategy/Planning Representative that this transmission-related information was sensitive information under the Standards of Conduct for Transmission Providers</p> |
| 08-07-2007 | <p>On July 20, 2007, a LG&E/KU Major Accounts Representative received an e-mail from a LG&E/KU Distribution Operations employee about the latter's investigation of an outage. That e-mail noted, "A trouble man was sent to check on targets on a 69 kV breaker in the Elizabethtown transmission switching station. The trouble man noticed a piece of conductor on the 69 kV where it passed over the tracks. Closer inspection revealed that the 69 kV line had been cut and the loose end sent upward and sent into the 69 kV phase near the Elizabethtown switching station." A Chief Compliance Office designee (CCO designee) advised both the Major Accounts Representative and the Operations Center Representative that this transmission-related information was sensitive information under the Standards of Conduct for Transmission Providers.</p> |

Note(s): 1.- Posting may also be made on LGEE OASIS administered by the SPP-ITO at:
<http://www.oatioasis.com/LGEE/index.html>.

Disclosure of Information¹

Revised June 25, 2010

Pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 358.7(a) (November 2008)

| | |
|------------|---|
| 07-12-2007 | <p>On June 24, 2007, at about 7:00 PM EDT, Toyota Motor Company (“the Customer”) experienced voltage dips of approximately 11% at its facilities near Georgetown, KY. The Customer subsequently asked KU if there were any transmission system events which may have contributed these fluctuations, and other past voltage fluctuations. Analysis by the LG&E/KU Transmission function indicated some Transmission-related events which may have impacted the Customer. The analysis is contained in the attached files: <i>Toyota Events A</i> and <i>Toyota Events B</i></p> |
| 04-17-2007 | <p>On Tuesday, April 17, 2007, at 1649 and 1650 hours EST, the LG&E/KU Regulated Generation Dispatch Desk received an alarm on the Lock 7 926-136 breaker operation. The Generation Dispatcher on duty was not aware of Lock 7 and he reported this event to the Manager, Regulated Generation Dispatch on the latter’s arrival on Wednesday morning. The Manager, Regulated Generation Dispatch reported this event to the Group Leader, System Operations (responsible for EMS Administration) and to a Chief Compliance Officer designee. (Lock 7, a three-unit hydroelectric facility, is owned and operated by Lock 7 Hydro Partners, LCC as the Mother Ann Lee Hydroelectric Station. The last known rating for Lock 7 was 700 +/- kW per unit for a total station rating of 2.1 MW.)</p> <p>The Group Leader, System Operations directed his EMS Administration staff to verify that all Lock 7 datapoints were set to Transmission-only. The EMS Administration staff confirmed this correction by e-mail, including the Chief Compliance Officer designee. The Chief Compliance Officer designee confirmed with LG&E/KU Generation Dispatch that no market advantage was gained from this information.</p> |
| 03-29-2007 | <p>Transmission Customer Question:</p> <p>Louisville Gas and Electric Company and Kentucky Utility Company received the following inquiry regarding events on the Louisville Gas and Electric Company and Kentucky Utility Company combined transmission system:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Please explain the following issues on the transmission feed to Madisonville</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>On January 13, 2007 @ 17:13 and on March 19, 2007 @ 19:19 hour we had a transmission interruption on the 69 kV feed to Madisonville South 1 and 2, McCoy Ave, and Madisonville East substations</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>On 3/27/07 @ 20:09 and on 3/28/07 @ 03:52 we had interruptions feeding the, Madisonville West, North, General Electric and Hospital substations.</i></p> <p><i>Answer:</i></p> |

Note(s): 1.- Posting may also be made on LGEE OASIS administered by the SPP-ITO at:
<http://www.oatioasis.com/LGEE/index.html>.

Disclosure of Information¹

Revised June 25, 2010

Pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 358.7(a) (November 2008)

| | |
|------------|---|
| | <p>The combined transmission system of Louisville Gas and Electric Company and Kentucky Utility Company experienced the following events:</p> <p><i>13 Jan 2007 17:14 EST</i> – Breaker operation at both ends of Green River (9-644)-Earlington N (202-634) 69 kV LINE due to storm. (A tap from this line serves Madisonville South, East, McCoy, Hanson.) Line automatically reenergized from Earlington N (202-634) end. Momentary outage.</p> <p><i>19 Mar 2007 19:19 EST</i> - Breaker operation occurred at both ends of Green River (9-644) -Earlington N (202-634) 69 kV line during a storm. (A tap from this line serves Madisonville South, East, McCoy, &Hanson) Momentary outage.</p> <p><i>27 Mar 2007 20:12 EST</i> - Phase on ground due to storm on the Earlington N (202-604) – Sentry - Nebo (228-634) 69 kV line which is parallel to the Earlington N (202-614) - Bell & Zoller - Nebo (228-644) 69 kV line (Madisonville GE, West, North, & Hospital loads are on a tap from the Earlington N (202-614) - Bell & Zoller - Nebo (228-644) 69 kV line). Earlington N-Bell & Zoller-Nebo 69 kV line did not relay, but would have seen voltage dip. Switching was accomplished to de-energize a portion of the parallel Earlington N-Bell & Zoller-Nebo 69 kV line, [Nebo (228-644) to Bell & Zoller (430-615)], but no customers were de-energized to accomplish the switching. No outage occurred.</p> <p><i>28 Mar 2007 03:52 EST</i> – No known transmission issues although a switch was reclosed at Bell & Zoller (430-615) without de-energizing the line at 06:42 EST. No outage of any kind.</p> |
| 02-19-2007 | <p>On September 16, 2006, a Transmission function employee forwarded an e-mail to an Energy Marketing employee. The e-mail contained a non-public schematic drawing as an attachment. The relevant drawing is attached. <i>Schematic Drawing</i></p> |
| 11-16-2006 | <p>An LG&E Energy Marketing Inc. (“LEM”) power dispatcher received a limited number of electronic mail messages from LG&E/KU Transmission function employees between November 6, 2006 and November 15, 2006. This power dispatcher, formerly a System Control Operator in the Transmission function, began his new duties with LEM on November 6, 2006. At that time, all access to Transmission systems, facilities, and documents was discontinued in accordance with the Company’s Standards of Conduct Written Procedures (SCWP). The transfer was noticed pursuant to the Company’s SCWP and in accordance with the Commission’s Regulations at 18 CFR § 358.4(c). A limited number of Transmission function employees, however, still included the transferred employee in their Microsoft Outlook E-mail Groups (<i>E-Mail Groups</i>). The CCO immediately directed all Transmission function employees</p> |

Note(s): 1.- Posting may also be made on LG&E OASIS administered by the SPP-ITO at:
<http://www.oatioasis.com/LGEE/index.html>.

Disclosure of Information ¹

Revised June 25, 2010

Pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 358.7(a) (November 2008)

| | |
|------------|--|
| | <p>to remove the transferred employee from their E-Mail Groups, to verify same once done, and to provide copies of all e-mails sent to the transferred employee after November 5, 2006. Some of the post-November 5 e-mails contained sensitive Transmission information. The relevant post-November 5 e-mails may be viewed at the following link: <i>Dispatcher E-Mails</i>.</p> |
| 10-18-2006 | <p>On October 17, 2006, a Generation Dispatcher for Unregulated Generation, <i>i.e.</i>, a Generation Dispatcher for LG&E Energy Marketing (“LEM”), while researching alarms for Western Kentucky Energy plants, accessed an Alarm Screen on the E.ON U.S. Energy Management System (“EMS”) which showed LG&E/KU Transmission-level alarms. The LEM Generation Dispatcher immediately reported this event to his Manager who directed that the EMS Administrators be notified. The Manager also reported this event to the CCO. The EMS Administrator disabled LEM’s access to the LG&E/KU Alarm Screen and confirmed same in follow-up calls or e-mails to the LEM Generation Dispatcher, his Manager, and a CCO designee. The EMS Administrator simultaneously confirmed that access was disabled for LG&E/KU Regulated Generation. The relevant Alarm Screen is real-time information and was, therefore, not available after a certain time. However, a representative portrayal of that screen is provided at the following link: <i>XM Alarm Sample</i>.</p> |
| 10-31-2006 | <p>During a September 15 phone call between LG&E/KU and Commission Staff, Staff requested LG&E/KU confirm that LG&E/KU Wholesale Market Function (“WMF”) employees and LG&E Energy Marketing (“LEM”) employees had not accessed three screens from the LG&E/KU Energy Management System (“EMS”) and had not acted on the information contained thereon. An audit by LG&E/KU’s Audit Services department determined the three EMS Screens had incorrect access protocols. At the time of the audit, the access protocols were immediately corrected. On October 25 and 26, 2006, completing WMF and LEM affidavits, confirming no prior access to the screens, required disclosure of the specific pages from the EMS audit report to the executing WMF and LEM employees. Disclosures of these screens discontinued with the completion of the affidavits. Screen 3 (page 3 of 3 in the attached link) revealed Hoosier Energy Co-op load at its Bridgeport substation. The following link shows the three EMS Screens: <i>EMS Screens</i></p> |
| 10-31-2006 | <p>During a September 15 phone call between LG&E/KU and Commission Staff, Staff requested LG&E/KU confirm that LG&E/KU Wholesale Market Function (“WMF”) employees and LG&E Energy Marketing (“LEM”) employees had not accessed three screens from the LG&E/KU Energy Management System (“EMS”) and had not acted on the information contained thereon. An audit by LG&E/KU’s Audit Services department determined the three EMS Screens had incorrect access protocols. At the time of the audit, the access protocols were immediately corrected. On October 25 and 26, 2006,</p> |

Note(s): 1.- Posting may also be made on LGEE OASIS administered by the SPP-ITO at:
<http://www.oatioasis.com/LGEE/index.html>.

Disclosure of Information ¹

Revised June 25, 2010

Pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 358.7(a) (November 2008)

| | |
|------------|---|
| | <p>completing WMF and LEM affidavits, confirming no prior access to the screens, required disclosure of the specific pages from the EMS audit report to the executing WMF and LEM employees. Disclosures of these screens discontinued with the completion of the affidavits. The first five rows of Screen 2 (page 2 of 3 in the attached link) LG&E/KU Regulated Generation data. The following link shows the three EMS Screens: <i>EMS Screens</i></p> |
| 08-21-2006 | <p>Effective August 18, 2006, John Voyles, LG&E/KU's Vice President Regulated Generation, assumed the role of interim LG&E/KU Director - Transmission following the departure of the Mark S. Johnson. On August 21, 2006, LG&E/KU posted Mr. Johnson's departure under Notice of Employee Transfer on the E.ON U.S. website at: http://www.eon-us.com/regulatory/soc.asp. While Mr. Voyles retains his Regulated Generation responsibilities, the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) has advised Mr. Voyles about activities during this interim period including his adherence to a set of business practices intended to ensure the continued compliance with FERC's Standards of Conduct, and the Code of Conduct pertaining to the relationship of the transmission function to the merchant function of both LG&E and KU. Further, the CCO advised Mr. Voyles that he was subject, at all times, to the "no conduit" rule, i.e., at no time should he communicate information or knowledge obtained from the Transmission Function, or use such information or knowledge in the direction, organization, or execution of the day-to-day business operations of any other function, e.g., Regulated Generation, reporting directly to him. Moreover, Mr. Voyles will not be involved in the day-to-day business operations of the LG&E/KU Transmission System during this interim period.</p> <p>Finally, on August 22, 2006, E.ON U.S. announced, effective August 28, 2006, Lonnie Bellar, E.ON U.S. Director of Financial Planning and Control, will become the Director - Transmission replacing Mr. Voyles.</p> |
| 08-15-2006 | <p>On August 15, 2006, at about 5:00 PM EDT, Financial Planning and Control personnel of E.ON U.S. Services e-mailed investment information, regarding the possible relocation of LG&E's Waterside Transmission Control Center, to senior management of LG&E/KU's Energy Marketing function and to senior Energy Affiliate personnel of LG&E/KU. This information included forecasted costs related to this relocation. No market action was taken with this information and Financial Planning and Control has been advised about the inappropriateness of this e-mail and directed to not include Energy Marketing and Energy Affiliate personnel in any such future communications. They have been advised that any questionable information should first be vented with the Chief Compliance Officer or his designee(s).</p> |
| 07-17-2006 | <p>On July 17, 2006, at about 1:45 PM EDT, the LG&E/KU Generation Dispatch desk fax machine received a fax from a Non-Affiliated Transmission Operator</p> |

Note(s): 1.- Posting may also be made on LGEE OASIS administered by the SPP-ITO at:
<http://www.oatioasis.com/LGEE/index.html>.

Disclosure of Information ¹

Revised June 25, 2010

Pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 358.7(a) (November 2008)

| | |
|------------|--|
| | <p>outside the LG&E/KU Control area. This fax was an Hourly Tie-Line Report. LG&E/KU Generation dispatchers discovered this report within a stack of faxes on July 24, 2006, and reported same to the Chief Compliance Officer. By electronic mail, a CCO designee notified the non-affiliated Transmission Operator of this event and requested that the LG&E/KU Generation Dispatch desk fax number be removed from the Non-Affiliated Transmission Operator's fax machine. On Monday, July 31, 2006, the Non-Affiliated Transmission Operator replied and stated that the LG&E/KU Generation Dispatch fax number was disabled and that all of the Non-Affiliated Transmission Operator's Control Center personnel was so informed.</p> |
| 07-17-2006 | <p>On July 17, 2006, between the hours of Midnight EDT and 2:00 AM EDT (0000 Hours EDT and 0200 Hours EDT), a Transmission Function employee at LG&E's Waterside Transmission Control Center inadvertently faxed a copy of an Hourly Tie-Line Report to the LG&E/KU (Regulated) Generation Dispatch desk. The fax number for the LG&E/KU Generation Dispatch desk had been removed from the speed dial of the fax machine at the Waterside Transmission Control Center. However, at about the same time, the Transmission Function employee was preparing to fax a copy of a completed ARS Event Report to the LG&E/KU Generation Dispatch desk. The employee mistakenly picked up the Hourly Tie-Line Report when he selected the fax number for the LG&E/KU Generation Dispatch desk, thus faxing the Hourly Tie-Line Report in error. The ARS Event Report was faxed later.</p> |
| 04-11-2006 | <p>On April 5, 2006, between the hours of 4:00 PM EDT and 8:00 PM EDT (1600 Hours EDT and 2000 hours EDT) a Generation Dispatcher for Western Kentucky Energy ("WKE"), <i>i.e.</i>, the Generation Dispatcher for Unregulated Generation, inadvertently viewed LG&E-related transmission information when he clicked on an LG&E icon versus a WKE icon in the Open System International ("OSI") system. The WKE Generation Dispatcher momentarily saw LG&E's Area Control Error ("ACE") Trend. The WKE Dispatcher immediately exited this screen and reported the event to his management who, in turn, reported it to the Standards of Conduct Chief Compliance Office ("SofC CCO") and to the SofC CCO's designee. The SofC CCO's designee related this information to those employees controlling access to the OSI System and the WKE Dispatch access to the aforementioned screen has been blocked.</p> |
| 03-31-2006 | <p>On or about September 17, 2004, in meetings involving LG&E/KU transmission personnel, LG&E/KU energy marketing personnel, and LG&E/KU executive management, LG&E/KU note that there were discussions about, and review of, information regarding the long-term operating plans for the LG&E/KU transmission system for 2005-2009. These discussions included the following information:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Key transmission system performance indicators including (i) SAIDI |

Note(s): 1.- Posting may also be made on LGEE OASIS administered by the SPP-ITO at:
<http://www.oatioasis.com/LGEE/index.html>.

Disclosure of Information ¹

Revised June 25, 2010

Pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 358.7(a) (November 2008)

| | |
|------------|---|
| | <p>[System Average Interruption Duration Index], (ii) Employee Headcount, (iii) Number of Recordable Injuries, and (iv) Actual and Planned Dollar Expenditures for O&M;</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Transmission O&M reconciliations to target numbers; 3. Summary of actual and planned revenues and expenses for transmission operations; 4. Transmission Capital reconciliations to target numbers; 5. Major Transmission capital projects. <p>This practice has been discontinued in compliance with the Company’s procedures for Cross Functional meetings. Moreover, LG&E/KU energy marketing personnel are no longer present when such information is reviewed.</p> <p>The pertinent slides which are the subject of the aforementioned meetings can be reviewed by clicking on the following link: <i>September 2004 Presentation Slides</i></p> |
| 03-31-2006 | <p>On or about September 10, 2003, in meetings involving LG&E/KU transmission personnel, LG&E/KU energy marketing personnel, and LG&E/KU executive management, LG&E/KU note that there were discussions about, and review of, information regarding the long-term operating plans for the LG&E/KU transmission system for 2004-2006. These discussions included the following information:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Key transmission system performance indicators including (i) SAIDI [System Average Interruption Duration Index], (ii) Employee Headcount, (iii) Number of Recordable Injuries, and (iv) Actual and Planned Dollar Expenditures for O&M; 2. Transmission O&M reconciliations to target numbers; 3. Summary of actual and planned revenues and expenses for transmission operations; 4. Transmission Capital reconciliations to target numbers; 5. Major Transmission capital projects. <p>This practice has been discontinued in compliance with the Company’s procedures for Cross Functional meetings. Moreover, LG&E/KU energy marketing personnel are no longer present when such information is reviewed.</p> <p>The pertinent slides which are the subject of the aforementioned meetings can be reviewed by clicking on the following link: <i>September 2003 Presentation Slides</i></p> |
| 03-31-2006 | <p>On a monthly basis, LG&E/KU’s transmission function provided the Midwest ISO (“MISO”) with after-the-fact, monthly historical peak transmission load information. The MISO used this information to invoice LG&E/KU for their Schedule 10 charges under the MISO tariff. LG&E/KU’s trading and marketing</p> |

Note(s): 1.- Posting may also be made on LGEE OASIS administered by the SPP-ITO at:
<http://www.oatioasis.com/LGEE/index.html>.

Disclosure of Information ¹

Revised June 25, 2010

Pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 358.7(a) (November 2008)

| | |
|-----------|--|
| | <p>group, <i>i.e.</i>, merchant function, was responsible for budgeting, approving, and paying this MISO invoice. Accordingly, LG&E/KU's transmission function provided the LG&E/KU merchant function with this after-the-fact, monthly historical peak transmission load information. In addition to the historical peak transmission load information relevant to the bills for the LG&E/KU merchant function, LG&E/KU's transmission function also shared historical peak load information of other transmission customers in these communications. LG&E/KU's transmission function began providing this information to the LG&E/KU merchant function at the commencement of MISO Day 1 operations, <i>i.e.</i>, February 1, 2002. This practice was discontinued on February 1, 2005.</p> |
| 1/13/2006 | <p>The following disclosures took place between January 2003 and November 2004, in telephone conversations between LG&E/KU generation dispatch personnel, MISO transmission operations personnel, and/or LG&E/KU transmission dispatch personnel. Information relating to transmission system operation was disclosed to LG&E/KU generation dispatch staff who are merchant function employees. The specifics of these disclosures follow.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. January 18, 2003, 06:35 AM: Disclosure of line loading level information from MISO transmission personnel to LG&E/KU generation dispatch and transmission dispatch personnel. The relevant phone conversation can be reviewed by clicking on the following link: <i>01-18-2003 0635 Call</i>2. May 25, 2004, 09:29 AM: Disclosure of system configuration information from MISO transmission personnel to LG&E/KU generation dispatch and transmission dispatch personnel. The relevant phone conversation can be reviewed by clicking on the following link: <i>05-25-2004 0929 Call</i>3. May 25, 2004, 09:31 AM: A Transmission dispatcher of LG&E/KU informed a generation dispatcher of LG&E/KU that there was a "bypass switch" that will be "closed" within the hour that could eliminate a line loading problem requiring generation redispatch. The relevant phone conversation can be reviewed by clicking on the following link: <i>05-25-2004 0931 Call</i>4. June 8, 2004, 06:13 AM: Disclosure of line loading level information from MISO transmission personnel to LG&E/KU generation dispatch and transmission dispatch personnel. The relevant phone conversation can be reviewed by clicking on the following link: <i>06-08-2004 0613 Call</i>5. November 14, 2004, 07:05 AM: Disclosure of line loading level information from MISO personnel to LG&E/KU generation dispatch and transmission dispatch personnel. The relevant phone conversation can be reviewed by clicking on the following link: <i>11-14-2004 0705 Call</i>6. November 15, 2004, 03:14 AM: Disclosure of line loading level information, during a redispatch event, from LG&E/KU transmission dispatch personnel to LG&E/KU generation dispatch personnel – the generation dispatcher was asked to reduce the Smith Station generation by |

Note(s): 1.- Posting may also be made on LGEE OASIS administered by the SPP-ITO at:
<http://www.oatioasis.com/LGEE/index.html>.

Disclosure of Information¹

Revised June 25, 2010

Pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 358.7(a) (November 2008)

| | |
|------------|---|
| | <p>another 25 MW given that an unnamed 345 kV line had “picked up another 5” . The relevant phone conversation can be reviewed by clicking on the following link: <i>11-15-2004 0314 Call</i></p> <p>7. November 15, 2004, 05:06 AM: Disclosure of line loading level information, during a redispatch event, from LG&E/KU transmission dispatch personnel to LG&E/KU generation dispatch personnel – included a statement that, in spite of redispatch, the line near the Smith Station “has picked up 13 on its contingency” and a statement that the transmission system had another undisclosed contingency that had been remedied. The relevant phone conversation can be reviewed by clicking on the following link: <i>11-15-2004 0506 Call</i></p> |
| 12/16/2005 | <p>LG&E/KU note the disclosure on December 16, 2005, at approximately 07:23 EST, of the following information in a facsimile sent in error by an LG&E/KU transmission dispatcher at the LG&E Waterside Transmission Control Center to a facsimile machine used by LG&E/KU generation dispatch personnel:</p> <p>a) Request For Shutdown – 48 Hours Advance Notice Required, for the Northside Substation, specifically Line NS-3816 and the following switches: NS-816 Line NS-816 Bus. Work related to this shutdown was to commence at approximately 07:00 and conclude at approximately 11:00.</p> |
| 10/26/2005 | <p>On 10/20/05, at approximately 16:18, LG&E Transmission Operations lost the Wickliffe bus and the 161 kV line from Grahamville to Wickliffe (“Grahamville-Wickliffe Line”) due a lighting strike at switch 161-834L. The Wickliffe bus was returned to service at approximately 18:00. However, due to the voltage differential at the Wickliffe bus and sensitivity of a large industrial retail load directly interconnected with these facilities, LG&E Transmission Operations scheduled the restoration of the Grahamville-Wickliffe Line for approximately 03:00 on 10/22/05. LG&E Transmission Operations discussed these customer specific concerns with LG&E Distribution Operations staff as part of its explanation for taking this approach.</p> <p>On 10/21/05, at approximately 14:30 EST, LG&E Transmission Operations received a call from an LG&E business service representative requesting that the Grahamville-Wickliffe line not be closed until 06:00 on 10/22/2005. This call was made by the business service representative at the direct request of the above-mentioned large retail customer in order to ensure that the customer would have staff available to assist if its large industrial retail load should trip off after reclose. LG&E Transmission Operations granted the customer-specific request, and the line was closed and placed back in service at 06:12 on 10/22/05.</p> |
| 10/25/2005 | <p>LG&E/KU note the disclosure on September 23, 2005, at approximately 12:16</p> |

Note(s): 1.- Posting may also be made on LG&E OASIS administered by the SPP-ITO at:
<http://www.oatioasis.com/LG&E/index.html>.

Disclosure of Information ¹

Revised June 25, 2010

Pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 358.7(a) (November 2008)

| | |
|------------|---|
| | <p>AM EST, of the following information in a facsimile sent in error by an LG&E/KU transmission dispatcher to a facsimile machine used by LG&E/KU generation dispatch personnel:</p> <p>A document entitled "Disturbance Reports" for the day September 22, 2005, which lists the following information:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">(a) Reference to Circuit AP-3844 being out at 1301, in at 1339, target of 138 kV bus Sec C Diff, nature of trouble being bus lock out – GE contractor failed to remove grounds(b) Reference to Circuit AP-3836 being out at 1301, in at 1339, target of 138 kV bus Sec C Diff, nature of trouble being bus lock out – GE contractor failed to remove grounds(c) Reference to Circuit AP-3873 being out at 1301, in at 1339, target of 138 kV bus Sec C Diff, nature of trouble being bus lock out – GE contractor failed to remove grounds |
| 08/05/2005 | <p>At approximately 5:12 PM on August 2, 2005, the LG&E generation dispatch function detected the inclusion of an alarm on the generation dispatch screens of the LG&E Energy Management System ("EMS"). The alarm message was in relation to a newly-created calculated value for the Lydon 6692 69 kV transmission facility, appearing in the alarm message as "LY-6692 EST MVA", that had recently been added to the EMS alarming system. At 6:01 PM the EMS support staff corrected the alarm assignment within the EMS such that the alarm reports only to the Transmission screens of the EMS and not to the generation dispatch screens of the EMS. Posting of this inadvertent disclosure was made to the LGEE page of the MISO OASIS on August 2, 2005.</p> |
| 06/23/2005 | <p>Kentucky Utilities Company will take the 138 kV transmission segment between the West Frankfort substation and the East Frankfort substation out of service for routine maintenance starting at 2200 EST on June 23, 2005. This outage is anticipated to last until 0400 EST on June 24, 2005.</p> |
| 06/15/2005 | <p>At approximately 15:07 hours on June 14, 2005, a lightning strike occurred on a 69kV line which affected service to a municipal, Nicholasville, and other loads. Service was restored to all customers by 17:26 hours on June 14, 2005. During the course of the service interruption, a distribution dispatcher at the Kentucky Utility distribution control center in Lexington, Kentucky told the Nicholasville customer account representative at LG&E, a merchant function employee, that a lightning strike affected the Higy Mill to Dix Dam 69kV line .</p> |

* Posting may also be made on LGEE OASIS of SPP at: <http://sppoasis.spp.org/OASIS/LGEE>

Note(s): 1.- Posting may also be made on LGEE OASIS administered by the SPP-ITO at: <http://www.oatioasis.com/LGEE/index.html>.